In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy by Roberto Perotti
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I thank the editors, my discussants Valerie Ramey and Ricardo Reis, and Olivier Blanchard, Fabio
Canova, Carlo Favero, Jordi Galí , Francesco Giavazzi, Ilian Mihov, Tommaso Monacelli, Evi Pappa,
and Luca Sala for discussions and suggestions. The paper also benefitted from comments on an earlier
version by seminar participants at the Bank of England, the London School of Economics, and Pompeu
Fabra University. Valerio Ercolani provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
© 2007 by Roberto Perotti. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy
Roberto Perotti




Most economists would agree that a hike in the federal funds rate will cause some slowdown in growth
and inflation, and that the bulk of the empirical evidence is consistent with this statement. But perfectly
reasonable economists can and do disagree even on the basic effects of a shock to government spending
on goods and services: neoclassical models predict that private consumption and the real wage will
fall, while some neo-keyenesian models predict the opposite. This paper discusses alternative time
series methodologies to identify government spending shocks and to estimate their effects. Applying
these methodologies to data from the US and three other OECD countries provides little evidence
in favor of the neoclassical predictions. Using the US input-output tables, the paper then turns to industry-level








Most economists would agree that an exogenous increase in the federal fund rate will lead
t oaf a l li ni n ﬂation and some slowdown in growth after a while; they would also prob-
ably agree that a large body of empirical research is consistent with this view, although
the timing and size of the eﬀect is subject to debate. In contrast, perfectly reasonable
economists can and do disagree on the basic theoretical eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, and on
the interpretation of the existing empirical evidence. For instance, neoclassical models
predict that private consumption and the real wage should fall following a positive shock
to government consumption, while some models with neo-keynesian features predict the
opposite. Especially in Europe, often journalistic and policy discussions take it for granted
that government spending stimulates consumption.
Also in contrast to the case of monetary policy, the existing empirical evidence can
be interpreted as supporting either view, depending on the methodology used to identify
the ﬁscal policy shocks. The “Dummy Variable” approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
extended to a full-ﬂedged VAR by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Burn-
side, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), is an application of the “event study” methodology
developed by Romer and Romer (1989) to study monetary policy. It typically ﬁnds that
during episodes of large, exogenous increases in defense spending output increases but
private consumption and the real wage fall. These results are consistent with the neoclas-
sical model: when government spending increases, the representative household is hit by
a negative wealth eﬀect due to the higher taxes it will have to pay, and consumption and
leisure fall; the resulting outshift in labor supply causes a decline in the real wage, along
a given labor demand.1
The results from the Structural Vector Autoregression approach of Fatás and Mihov
(2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) are typically of the opposite
sign: following a government spending shock private consumption and the real wage
increase. This is consistent with some neo-keynesian models, where government spending
causes a shift in labor demand, for instance because of countercyclical markups generated
by nominal price rigidities or other reasons; the resulting increase in the real wage can
induce higher consumption, via a substitution eﬀect or because of the presence of credit
constraints.
This paper is an exercise on the robustness of these results, and an investigation of
the underlying methodologies. I ﬁrst show that the evidence from the Dummy Variable
approach is due to the imposition of two restrictions: ﬁrst, all Ramey-Shapiro episodes
have the same dynamics, up to a scale factor; second, in a version of this approach ﬁscal
policy explains all the deviation from “normal” of all endogenous variables for several
quarters after the start of these episodes. The second assumption runs contrary to the
spirit of this approach, which is based on the notion that we can learn from these episodes
1See section 10 for a brief review of recent models of ﬁscal policy.
1because they are exogenous and “big”, not because they are “diﬀerent”. Once these
restrictions are removed, the results from this method are comparable to those of the
SVAR approach: private consumption and the real wage increase in response to the ﬁscal
shocks of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, and there is little sign of the movement in opposite
directions of consumption and GDP that is the hallmark of the neoclassical model. The
existing diﬀerences among the four episodes can in part be explained by the diﬀerent
patterns of behavior of taxation and of defense vs. civilian government spending in each
episode: I then show that these diﬀerences also are consistent with the evidence from the
SVAR approach. The latter, however, suﬀers from its own fundamental problem, namely
the possibility that its estimated shocks are in reality anticipated by the private sector.
To overcome some of the problems of the two approaches, Ramey (2006) advocates the
estimation of ﬁscal policy SVARs using long-run annual data. Over a sample extending
back to 1889, the response of consumption to a government spending shock is again
consistent with the neoclassical model, in contrast to the quarterly SVARs estimated over
the post-war period. However, prior to the oﬃcial BEA statistics that start in 1929 several
components of government spending were interpolated linearly over long intervals, and
had a number of other problems. When only the oﬃcial BEA data from 1929 are used,
again the responses of consumption and of the real wage to a government spending shock
become positive, and can be estimated with a good degree of precision.
Two-sector versions of the neoclassical and neo-keynesian models imply diﬀerent re-
actions of the real product wage in each sector, depending on the size of the government
spending shock that falls on each sector. Hence, sectoral evidence around the Ramey-
Shapiro episodes can shed light on the underlying mechanism. Using the US input output
tables, I show that during the last two Ramey-Shapiro episodes the sectors that were
most intensive in the government spending shock also experienced on average signiﬁcantly
higher increases in the real product wage. This is consistent with some neo-keynesian two-
sector models, but diﬃcult to reconcile with neoclassical two-sector models.
I then replicate the SVAR analysis in three more countries - Australia, Canada and the
United Kingdom - for which both non-interpolated quarterly data and long run annual
data on ﬁscal policy exist. The results from both the quarterly and the annual SVARs
are qualitatively consistent with the US evidence, although in general the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy shocks are smaller.
In this paper, I focus on the responses of consumption and the real wage. These
variables are of independent interest to macroeconomists, but also as we have seen they
respond very diﬀerently to government spending shocks in diﬀerent models; hence they
are useful to shed light on the underlying transmission mechanism of ﬁscal policy. I
also present evidence on private investment, although here the predictions of alternative
models are much less sharp, and depend on a number of factors that are diﬃcult to control
for in a VAR. Because of space constraints, I leave a detailed analysis of the responses of
2the interest rate and of inﬂation to future work.2
I focus on shocks to current government spending on goods and services (“government
spending” from now on) because this is the largest part of non-transfer spending, and the
mechanisms driving its eﬀects in the diﬀerent models are clearly identiﬁable. Government
investment introduces an entirely diﬀerent eﬀe c t-t h ee x t e r n a l i t yo np r i v a t es e c t o rp r o -
ductivity in the long run - which is also largely common to all models.3 Ia l s od on o t
study the eﬀects of tax shocks: these are more diﬃcult to identify in a SVAR4, and, when
taxation is distortionary, their theoretical eﬀects depend crucially on the time proﬁle of
the tax response.5
This paper has several antecedents: some of the exercises that I perform here can
be found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Pappa (2005), and
Ramey (2006). Of course, several other papers estimate impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks:
these will be acknowledged along the way.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the two empirical ap-
proaches introduced above. Section 3 discusses brieﬂy the data and the speciﬁcation of
the models to be estimated. Section 4 presents the eﬀects of ﬁs c a ls h o c k so nG D P ,p r i -
vate consumption and investment in the two approaches. Section 5 discusses alternative
explanations of the diﬀerences among the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, mainly the tax poli-
cies accompanying the government spending shocks and the composition of government
spending. Section 6 presents evidence from estimates that use long run annual data. Sec-
tion 7 discusses the responses of labor market variables, namely hours and the real wage
in the business sector and in manufacturing. Section 8 discusses the evidence from input
-output tables around the Vietnam War and the Reagan buildup. Section 9 presents evi-
dence from Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Section 10 discusses some recent
models of ﬁscal policy and their key testable predictions. The last section concludes.
2To estimate the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on interest rates one probably needs to impose more structure
than is present in the SVARs discussed in this paper. In fact, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) include debt
and the cross-equation restrictions implied by the dynamic government budget in a Blanchard-Perotti
SVAR. They show that, while the responses of all other variables are unaﬀected, it is now possible to
estimate more precisely a positive response of the interest rate to government spending shocks Dai and
Philippon (2006) also add more structure to a Blanchard-Perotti SVAR by incorporating information
from a large cross-section of bond prices; again they ﬁnd a positive response of interest rates to a deﬁcit
shock.
3For a comparison of the eﬀects of government consumption and government investment shocks, see
Perotti (2004).
4In a promising recent development, Romer and Romer (2006) identify shocks to revenues in the
post-war period from a detailed analysis of government documents.
5Using a standard neoclassical model, Cooley and Ohanian (1997) and Ohanian (1997) show that the
diﬀerent time proﬁles of the tax rates during WWII vs. the Korean War in the US, and during WWII
and the postwar period in the UK vs. the US, had important eﬀects on output and welfare.
32 Two approaches to the identiﬁcation of ﬁscal shocks
I now describe brieﬂy the two approaches to identify ﬁscal policy shocks that I will compare
in this paper. At least a third approach has been used in the literature, based on sign
restrictions, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2002) and Pappa (2005). For lack of space, I do
not discuss this methodology here; however, Pappa (2005) and Caldara and Kemp (2006)
show that it delivers responses of private consumption that are close to those estimated
in the SVAR approach below: in particular, private consumption typically rises after a
government spending shock.
2.1 The dummy variable approach
How to disentangle the exogenous, unanticipated component of ﬁscal policy changes? The
“narrative” or “Dummy Variable” approach tries to isolate the typical deviation from the
“normal” path of the endogenous variables caused by a series of post-war “abnormal” ﬁscal
events, namely military buildups driven by foreign policy. On the basis of contemporary
accounts in the press, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identiﬁed three episodes of expansionary
defense spending that could reasonably be interpreted as exogenous and unforeseen: the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan buildup; following Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004) and Ramey (2006), I add the Bush buildup that started at the end of
2001.
2.1.1 The DV1 methodology
Deﬁne the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables D1t,D 2t,D 3t and D4t as taking the value of
1 at the start of each of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, on 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1, and
2001:4 respectively. Deﬁne the “combined” Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable as Dt =
D1t + D2t + D3t + D4t.
Let Xt be the vector of endogenous variables, whose ﬁrst three elements are government
spending gt, taxes tt, and output yt. The ﬁrst version of the Dummy Variable approach
(“DV1” for brevity) was introduced in a univariate context by Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
and applied in a multivariate context by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999)). It
consists of estimating the reduced form VAR
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + B(L)Dt + Ut, (1)
where A(L) is a polynomial of order nA,B (L) is a polynomial of order nB +1, and Ut is
the vector of reduced form residuals. The typical eﬀect of these ﬁscal shocks can be found
by tracing the dynamic eﬀects of a unit shock to the dummy variable: i.e., the response
of the endogenous variables at t + k is given by the estimated coeﬃcient on Lk in the
expansion of (I − A(L)L)
−1 B(L).
4Outside these Ramey-Shapiro episodes, the dynamic response of the economy to a
shock to government spending is governed by the polynomial (I − A(L)L)
−1 ; thus the
response to a shock to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variable represents the typical deviation
of the economy from its normal behavior, when a Ramey-Shapiro episode occurs. Because
the dummy variable appears in all equations of the system, this methodology assumes that
during a Ramey-Shapiro episode not only the ﬁscal variables deviate from normal, but
also that the dynamic response of all variables to the ﬁscal variables can change.
2.1.2 The DV2 methodology
The DV1 approach imposes a strong restriction on the data: the shape and size of the
responses of all variables to the shock are the same in each Ramey-Shapiro episode. A
less stringent version of this approach (introduced by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004)) consists in allowing each episode to have a diﬀerent intensity, although the shape
of the responses is still assumed to be the same. In this DV2 variant of the approach,
one estimates the VAR:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 +
4 P
i=1
B(L)θiDit + Ut, (2)
where θ1 =1and θ2,θ 3,θ 4 are scalars that measure the intensity of the last three Ramey-
Shapiro episodes relative to the Korean War.
2.1.3 The DV3 methodology
The DV2 methodology still imposes the constraint that the shapes of the responses of a
given variable must be the same in each episode. However, each episode might consist
of diﬀerent policies, like a tax cut in one episode and a tax increase in another. Table 1
lists all the quarters in the sample when the percentage change in government spending
or the change in the Barro-Shasakul average marginal income tax rate on labor income6
exceeded two standard deviations. It is clear that each episode had its own speciﬁc ﬁscal
action. For instance, taxes increased repeatedly during the Korean War, in 1950, 1951 and
1952, while the Vietnam War was accompanied by tax cuts. Building on Fatás and Mihov
(2001), who point out the diﬀerences between the individual Ramey-Shapiro episodes, in
the DV3 variant I allow the responses to each Ramey-Shapiro episode to have a diﬀerent
intensity and shape:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 +
4 P
i=1
Bi(L)Dit + Ut, (3)
where each Bi(L) is a nB +1 -order vector polynomial.
6This is an annual variable calculated by Barro and Sahasakul (1983), updated by Stephenson (1998)
up to 1996 and by myself afterwards.
5Table 1: Large changes in ﬁscal variables in the US
sd of ∆g =0 . 0 2 sd of ∆ t = 0.55
|
∆g
sd |>=3 2 < |
∆g
sd | < 3 |∆ t
sd |>= 3 2< |∆ t
sd | < 3
50:4 0.08 48:2 0.04 48:1 -3.2 50:1 1.2
51:1 0.09 50:3 -0.04 51:1 3.3 68:1 1.6
51:2 0.11 52:2 0.04 52:1 1.7 70:1 -1.3
51:3 0.10 54:1 -0.05 54:1 -2.4 83:1 -1.6
54:2 -0.04 64:1 -2.3 02:1 -1.2




g: log of government spending on goods and services, ex-
cluding non-defense capital spending. T: average marginal
income tax rate on labor income.
2.1.4 The modiﬁed DV methodology
Quite apart from the possible loss of precision in estimation, the DV3 approach suﬀers
from an extreme version of a problem already present in the DV1 and DV2 approaches:
since each dummy appears separately in all equations, the residuals of each equation at
the onset of each Ramey-Shapiro event and during the following nB quarters are set to
0; in other words, the method assumes that the “abnormal” ﬁscal events are entirely
responsible for all the deviation from normal of all variables for nB +1quarters.
But the logic of the method is that we learn from the Ramey-Shapiro episodes because
they are exogenous and “big”, thus highly informative on the working of ﬁscal policy, not
because the economy behaves “diﬀerently” in some fundamental way.7 Thus, a better
interpretation of this logic consists in isolating the “abnormal” ﬁscal events and estimating
the “normal” dynamic response of the non-ﬁscal endogenous variables to these events.
This interpretation can be formalized by including lags 0 to nB of the dummy variables
in the government spending and tax equations, and only lag 0 in the other equations. This
can be done for the combined dummy variable (thus obtaining the modiﬁed DV1 and
the modiﬁed DV2 methods) or for each Ramey-Shapiro variable (the modiﬁed DV3
approach). In these speciﬁcations, after the impact eﬀect the behavior of the non-ﬁscal
variables is explained by their normal dynamics in response to the deviations from normal
of the ﬁscal variables.
7McGrattan and Ohanian (2006) emphasize this interpretation of the biggest such episode of all,
WWII.
62.2 The SVAR approach
The SVAR approach starts from the reduced form speciﬁcation:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + Ut (4)
Xt is the vector of endogenous variables; for simplicity, in this section I assume that it
consists of output yt, government spending gt, and taxes tt. The reduced form residuals
of the gt and tt equations, u
g
t and ut
t, can be thought of as linear combinations of three
components. First, the automatic response government spending and taxes to innovations
in output, inﬂation and the interest rate. Second, the systematic discretionary response
of policymakers to innovations in the other endogenous variables; for instance, reductions
in tax rates implemented systematically in response to recessions. Third, random discre-
tionary shocks to ﬁscal policies; these are the “structural” ﬁscal shocks, which unlike the
reduced form residuals are uncorrelated with all other structural shocks.8 This is also the
component one is interested in when estimating impulse responses to ﬁscal policy shocks.
Formally, and assuming for illustrative purposes the vector Xt includes only three vari-
























“structural” ﬁscal shocks, with cov(e
g
t,e t
t)=0 .C l e a r l y ,e
g
t and et
t are correlated with the
reduced form residuals, hence they cannot be obtained by an OLS estimation of (5) and
(6).
The key to identiﬁcation is the observation that it typically takes longer than a quar-
ter for discretionary ﬁscal policy to respond to, say, an output shock, hence the second
component, the systematic discretionary response is absent in quarterly data. As a conse-
quence, the coeﬃcients αty and αgy in (5) and (6) capture only the automatic response of
ﬁscal variables to economic activity. One can then use available external information on
the elasticity of taxes and spending to GDP, inﬂation and interest rates to compute the
appropriate values of these elasticities (see section 3);9 with these, one can then construct












8One could argue that, in a sense, all changes in ﬁscal policy are discretionary: in theory, policymakers
can always undo the eﬀects of changes in output and prices on revenues and spending. While this might
be true over the long run, with quarterly data the distinction appears meaningful.
9Importantly, these values of the elasticities of government revenues and transfers are not estimated,
but computed from institutional information on statutory tax brackets, the distribution of taxpayers by
















t can be obtained by orthogonalization, i.e. by assuming βgt =0or βtg =0 ;s i n c e




t is always very low, the actual ordering does not
matter; as a benchmark, I will use the ﬁrst orthogonalization.
The two structural shocks thus estimated are orthogonal to the other structural shocks
of the economy, hence they can be used as instruments in the remaining equations: thus,














t. If there is another variable, like inﬂation, its residual is ﬁrst subtracted from
the gt and tt residuals - using an external elasticity - to obtain the cyclically adjusted ﬁscal
shocks, as in (7) and (8); then the equivalent of the GDP equation above for inﬂation can
be estimated, adding u
y





t, as instruments. 10 Once the
structural shocks are identiﬁed, the impulse responses are constructed using the average
elasticities over the relevant sample periods.
2.3 Discussion
The advantage of the Dummy Variable approach is that it does not require any further
assumption to identify ﬁscal shocks. It suﬀers from two potential problems. The ﬁrst
is an extreme case of the small sample problem: obviously the identifying assumption of
the method is that the dummy variable should be uncorrelated with the residuals of each
equation contemporaneously and up to nB lags; but with such a small number of episodes
(in the case of the DV3 method, just one for each polinomial Bi(L)), how does one know
if the Ramey-Shapiro dummy captures the onset of the Korean War, or, say, the delayed
eﬀect of the 1948 tax cut (according to the classiﬁcation of Romer and Romer (2006), the
largest in US history), or other non-ﬁscal shocks?
A second question is again well illustrated by the Korean War dummy variable. Table
1 shows that this episode consisted of a string of large increases in government spending
starting in the fourth quarter of 1950, raising the issue whether these were anticipated or
not as of the beginning of the episode: does the path of private consumption from 1950:3
on represent the dynamic response to an unanticipated, one-oﬀ wealth eﬀect occurring
in 1950:3 which takes into account the whole increase in government spending during
the episode; or does it represent the result of many small wealth shocks that occur each
quarter after 1950:3?
More generally, one can interpret the deviation from normal behavior following the
onset of an episode at time t0 in two ways: it could describe the predictable “typical”
deviations from normal after these “abnormal” events; or it could capture a sequence of
10The ordering of the remaining variables is immaterial if one is only interested in estimating the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy shocks, as it is the case in this paper.
8new ﬁscal shocks after t0. In the former case the response of consumption at t0 reﬂects
the wealth eﬀect caused by the entire subsequent path of government spending; in the
latter, the response of consumption in each period would reﬂect the new ﬁscal shocks.
It will come as no surprise to anybody that the overall costs of wars are diﬃcult to
predict. It is instructive to see by how much. On April 22, 2003, 1 months after the
start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
contained a range of estimates of the war on Iraq and of the ensuing occupation. The price
tag on a two-months war plus the occupation for FY 2003 ranged from $54bn to $98.6bn.
The costs of occupation per year was estimated at $45.6bn for 200,000 troops. The Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment estimated the total cost of a 5-year occupation
from $25bn to $105bn. Although the administration did not release estimates, the press
reported an administration estimate of $20bn per year, for two years. Thus, in April 2003
the highest possible price tag for the years 2003 through 2006 that a (very) well informed
individual could have gathered from the debate was $98.6bn + $45.6bn x 3 = $235.4bn;
and this assuming that there would still be a very substantial military presence in 2006 -
an event not many would have considered likely at the time. Using for instance the CSBA
median estimate would have put the price tag at $98.6bn + $13bn x 3 = $138.7bn.
The most recent Congressional Research Service Report on the war, issued on Sep-
tember 22 2006, estimates cumulated appropriations through 2006, of which $287.6bn for
DoD alone. In 2005 the average troop level in Iraq was 202,000, yet the DoD obligations
were $70.9bn, against the $45.6bn predicted in 2003 for an occupation force of 200,000
troops. The CBO now estimates that the cumulative cost of the global war on terror
will be $634bn in 2010 and $808bn in 2016. It is hard to believe that the 2001:4 dummy
captures anything remotely close to a wealth eﬀect of $808bn.11
The key question of the SVAR approach concerns the predictability of its estimated
shocks. While decision lags help identify the ﬁscal shocks, implementation lags could
cause the latter to be anticipated by the private sector; the resulting impulse responses
would be biased. This is a legitimate and important concern. Suppose that the data
are generated by the neoclassical model, but the government spending shocks estimated
by the econometrician are in reality anticipated by the private sector by one period; as
Ramey (2006) shows, the econometrician will ﬁnd a positive response of consumption to
her estimated government spending shock. The intuition is simple: in the neoclassical
model, at the time of the true temporary shock consumption falls on impact, to return
back to the steady state slowly as capital accumulates; the econometrician would then
just capture the increasing part of the consumption path, after the impact eﬀect. The
ﬁrst panel of Figure 1, which replicates a ﬁgure in Ramey (2006), displays the true and
estimated responses of consumption to a government spending shock that is announced
11McGrattan and Ohanian (2006) estimate transition matrices for diﬀerent states (i.e., levels of gov-
ernment spending) in each year of WWII; once fed into a standard neoclassical model, they explain well
the behavior of consumption during WWII.
9one quarter in advance, in a simple model like Baxter and King (1993) with a Cobb-
Douglas production function and utility of the form Ut =l o g ( Ct)+ l o g ( 5 0 0 −Ht), where
H is quarterly hours.
The same intuition suggests, however, that with habit persistence in consumption the
model would still exhibit a negative consumption response. In the second panel, the utility
function has been modiﬁed to Ut =l o g ( Ct − γCt−1)+ l o g ( 5 0 0 − Ht) where γ = .65 as
in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Now the estimated response still exhibits a
decline in consumption. Of course, if the shock were anticipated by more than 1 quarter
the estimated decline in consumption would be smaller.
Ultimately, how much the estimated SVAR ﬁscal shocks are anticipated and how much
this matters is an empirical question. Obviously I will not be able to provide a full answer,
but I will provide some clues in section 4.3, after presenting the evidence from the DV
and SVAR approaches. Note however that the same issue arises in the DV approach.
Strictly speaking, the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables should capture the moment the
wealth eﬀect manifests itself, i.e. the quarter in which a future military buildup becomes
common knowledge. Assuming such a date can be deﬁned, it is certainly easy for the
econometrician to miss its timing by 1 or 2 quarters; and indeed, as discussed above there
might not be a unique such shock.
3 The data and speciﬁcations
The benchmark speciﬁcation of the VAR consists of 7 variables: government spending
on goods and services gt, the Barro-Sahasakul average marginal income tax rate tt,r e a l
GDP yt, private consumption on nondurables and services ct, private gross ﬁxed capital
formation kt (except for tt, all in log of real, per capita values), the log of hours in the
non-farm business sector et, and the log of the real product hourly compensation in the
non farm business sector wt. In alternative speciﬁcations, the two labor market variables
are replaced by the GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate πt and the 3-months nominal interest
rate it; in yet a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, tt is represented by the log of real per capita net
taxes.12 I also experiment with a smaller 4-variable VAR that includes gt,y t, ct, and kt.
The average marginal income tax rate is the same variable used by Edelberg, Eichen-
baum and Fisher (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004), and proxies for
the distortionary eﬀects of taxation; net taxes, used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
capture the net ﬂow of resources from the private sector to the government, an important
variable in a model with credit constraints. The interest rate controls for monetary pol-
icy. The small VAR is meant to facilitate comparisons with historical SVARs with annual
data, which, because of the smaller sample size, will be based on this speciﬁcation. In
general, all these alternative speciﬁcations generate nearly identical results, hence I will
12Net taxes are deﬁn e sa st a xr e v e n u e sl e s st r a n s f e r st oh o u s e h o l d sa n ds u b s i d i e s .
10focus on the benchmark 7-variable speciﬁcation.
An important recent debate has focused on the robustness of SVARs estimates of the
eﬀects of technology shocks, depending on the method used to induce stationarity. I
will discuss all results from two alternative variants of the speciﬁcations above, with a
constant and a linear trend (“LT speciﬁcation”), and with all variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences
(“I1 speciﬁcation”).
Each equation includes 4 lags of the endogenous variables; the Ramey-Shapiro dummy
variables are entered with lags 0 to 6.
All ﬁscal variables are deﬁned at the level of the general government (i.e., the federal,
state, and local governments, plus social security ﬁnds). Government spending on goods
and services includes government consumption plus defense investment in machinery and
equipment. Private consumption includes non-durables and services, and private invest-
ment does not include the change in inventories. The sample starts in 1947:1 and ends in
2005:4 (the average marginal income tax rate ends in 2003:4). Appendix A (available on
the author’s web site) describes the data in greater detail.
The elasticities of government revenues are constructed from the annual elasticities
computed by Giorno et al. (1995) and updated by Van der Noord (2002), based on
the actual tax codes and the distribution of incomes across households; these have been
adjusted to convert them into quarterly elasticities and to take into account possible col-
lection lags.13 Appendix B (available on the author’s web site) describes the construction
of the tax elasticities. Note that the Barro-Shasakul average marginal income tax rate
is a policy variable, hence by assumption it does not respond to shocks to the non ﬁscal
endogenous varaibles within a given quarter; thus, in speciﬁcations that use this variable
government spending shocks are identiﬁed via a simple Choleski ordering.14
4 Output and its components
4.1 The DV approach
Figure 2 begins with the DV1 and DV3 approaches on each column (results from the
DV2 approach are nearly identical to those from the DV1 approach, and everything I
13The OECD estimates of these elasticties start in 1960: for 1947-1959, I have assumed the 1960 value.
This is certainly a crude approximation, but note that the estimated responses to a government spending
shock, on which this paper focuses, are virtually invariant to the tax elasticities. Based on the identifying
assumption that government spending cannot react to I have assumed a quarterly government spending
output elasticity of 0, and a quarterly elasticty to the price level of -.5 (recall that government spending
is in real terms).
The value of the elasticity of personal income taxes to income computed by the OECD displays a large
discrete drop in 1992. Nothing would change if one were to use the average value of this elasticity over
the sample, or a smoothed version of it.
14For simplicty, and somewhat improperly, I will continue to use the expression “SVAR” in these cases.
11will say about the DV1 approach also applies to the DV2 approach). It displays the
responses of government spending, the average marginal income tax rate, GDP, private
consumption, and private investment, from the benchmark 7-variable VAR. All equations
contain a constant and a linear trend. All endogenous variables are entered with 4 lags;
the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables with lags 0 to 6. The ﬁrst ﬁve rows display the
responses in the DV1 approach and in the individual episodes of the DV3 approach: the
next ﬁve rows display the responses in the modiﬁed DV1 and DV3 approaches. Each panel
displays the point estimate of the variable indicated on the row, with the 16th and 84th
percentiles of the responses based on 500 Montecarlo simulations (on bootstrapping in
the modiﬁed DV approaches). The responses of government spending, consumption and
investment are expressed in percentage points of GDP by multiplying the log response by
hundred times the average share of each variable in GDP.
The Korean war is by far the largest episode in terms of government spending, with
a peak increase after two years of almost 7 percent of GDP above trend, followed by the
Vietnam war with a peak of 1.5 percent after the same interval. The other two episodes
exhibit no increase in government spending (the military expansion was compensated by
a reduction in civilian spending of the same size).
It is well known that, largely due to an ideological aversion of President Truman to
budget deﬁcits, the Korean war buildup was mostly ﬁnanced with taxes: in fact, row 2
shows that the average marginal tax rate on labor increases by 3 percentage points above
trend 6 quarters after the start of the episode. The tax rate increased also, with a lag, in
the Reagan buildup15, while it fell in the Vietnam and Bush buildups.
Output increases in the DV1 approach, and also in the Korean and Vietnam wars; it
falls in the Reagan and Bush buildups. In the two quarters after the start of the Reagan
buildup, quarterly GDP growth was -7.8 and -.7 percent, then recovered to 7.6 and 8.4
percent, then fell to negative values for another6q u a r t e r s ;t h i sp a t t e r n si sc a p t u r e dc l e a r l y
by the GDP response in the DV3 approach, since the latter attributes all the residual of
the GDP regression to the buildup. A similar story holds for the Bush buildup.
In the DV1 approach consumption declines signiﬁcantly, by almost 1 percent of GDP
after 1 year. This result is similar to Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), who how-
ever ﬁnd a more modest, and insigniﬁcant, decline. Thus, the DV1 approach shows rising
output and declining consumption, the typical neoclassical pattern after a government
spending shock. However, when one separates the four episodes in the DV3 approach
it becomes clear that, because of the constraints it imposes, the DV1 approach cannot
capture the typical patterns of comovements between government spending and GDP on
one hand, and consumption on the other, that occur in the individual episodes. Except
for Korea, where consumption is ﬂat, in the other episodes the response of consumption
has the same sign and even the same shape as that of GDP. The DV1 approach captures
15Although the timing is not exactly right because the average marginal income tax rate is an annual
variable, this increase captures the Tax Equity and Responsibility Tax Act of 1982.
12mostly the large increases in government spending and GDP in the ﬁrst two episodes,
and the large decline in consumption in the last two. Similarly, in the DV1 approach
private investment (row 5) falls; but among the individual episodes it is only in Korea
that investment moves in the opposite direction to GDP; in the others, it follows closely
the GDP response. Estimation in ﬁrst diﬀerences generates the same results (not shown).
The last ﬁve rows display the responses of the same variables in the modiﬁed DV1 and
DV3 approaches. In row 3, the post-Vietnam GDP expansion was of similar size to the
post-Korea one, despite the much smaller increase in government spending in the former.
The modiﬁed method in row 8 does not attribute all the large post—Vietnam expansion to
the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, but only the “normal” GDP response (taking into account
possibly diﬀerent patterns of the tax rate in the various episodes). Note also that now
the methodology does not attribute the small recession of 1982 to the Bush ﬁscal episode,
hence GDP rises above trend, despite the ﬂat government spending response; one possible
reason is the tax cut that accompanied this episode.16 But GDP still falls in response to
the Reagan episode: government spending is ﬂat, but the tax rate increase.
Now consumption rises signiﬁcantly above trend even during the Korean War; thus,
it increases in all episodes except the Reagan buildup, when GDP fell. Hence, in the
modiﬁed approach the consumption response has the same sign as the GDP in the DV1
approach, and in all individual episodes.
Conditional on a Ramey-Shapiro shock, the response of investment also mostly reﬂects
that of GDP in the modiﬁed DV approaches too.
4.2 The SVAR approach
Figure 3 displays impulse responses from the SVAR approach. The shock to government
spending is normalized to 1 percentage point of GDP.
In the ﬁrst column, each equation in the VAR includes a linear trend, and the sample
starts in 1947:1. Both GDP and consumption exhibit a hump-shaped response, with peaks
of about 1.2 and .4 percentage points of GDP, respectively, after about 2 years. Thus, the
SVAR evidence on consumption appears consistent with the DV3 evidence: conditional
on a government spending shock, the response of consumption largely mimics that of
GDP.
Quantitatively, however, in this sample the SVAR approach delivers a small response
of consumption. Not surprisingly, it turns out that this depends strongly on the role of
the Korean War. When the sample omits the ﬁscally turbulent late forties and early ﬁfties
and starts in 1954:1 (column 2), the positive response of consumption rises to a peak of
16Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) argue precisely that the diﬀerent responses of taxes in the Bush build-
up, relative to the typical response estimated via the DV2 method during the Ramey-Shapiro episodes,
explains the decline in GDP.
13about .9 percent of GDP after 3 years.17 This is consistent with the evidence from the
DV approach, since the sample now omits the Korean War with its large increases in
government spending and in the tax rate. In fact, the tax rate rises in the long sample,
and it is ﬂat in the shorter sample.
In the I1 speciﬁcation the results are similar: a small positive response of GDP and
private consumption in the longer sample, and a larger and signiﬁcant response in the
shorter sample; the peak eﬀects, however, are smaller than in the LT speciﬁcation.
Investment falls, typically by between .4 and .8 percentage points of GDP. This is
due in almost equal parts to machinery and equipment and to residential investment;
investment in structures is ﬂat.18 All these results persist in the I1 speciﬁcation.
4.3 Predictability of the SVAR ﬁscal shocks
Are the SVAR government spending shocks predictable?
Table 2: Forecastability of R-S dummy and SVAR shocks
Full sample Short sample
1 OLS: SVAR g shock on 4 lags of the R-S combined dummy 0.03 0.85
2 OLS: SVAR g shock on 4 lags of each R-S dummy 0.00 0.52
3 OLS: Ramey-Shapiro dummy on 4 lags of g, t and y shock 0.02 0.01
4 Probit: Ramey-Shapiro dummy on 4 lags of g, t and y shock 0.58
In rows 1 to 3, the last two columns display the p-value of a test of the exclusion
of all regressors in the equation. In row 4, the second to last column indicates the
probability of 1950:3.
"Full sample": 1947:1-2003:4; "Short sample": 1954:1-2003:4.
Following Ramey (2006), a ﬁrst obvious candidate as a predictor is the Ramey - Shapiro
dummy variable itself. The ﬁrst row of Table 2 shows that, like in Ramey (2006), over the
full sample starting in 1947:1 the combined Ramey-Shapiro dummy Granger causes the
government spending SVAR shock; the next row shows that the individual dummies are
even more (jointly) signiﬁcant in predicting the SVAR spending shock. However, row 3
shows that in a OLS regression the lagged government spending, tax and GDP shocks also
predict the Ramey-Shapiro combined dummy, with a p-value of 2 percent.19 As Leeper
17Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2006) also start the sample in 1954:1, and ﬁnd similarly higher re-
sponses of consumption.
18The responses of the components of private investment are obtained from 7-variable SVARs in which
total private investment is replaced by each component in turn.
19Ramey (2006) ﬁnds that the government spending shock does not Granger cause the Ramey-Shapiro
dummy. However, to assess whether the latter is forecastable there is no reason to limit oneself to the
government spending shock as a predictor; in fact, the estimated tax and GDP shocks are equally plausible
candidates, and turn out to have more forecasting power.
14(1997) argues, a probit regression may be more appropriate than a linear one to predict
a dummy variable; in this case, the lagged SVAR shocks are no longer jointly signiﬁcant
in predicting the Ramey-Shapiro dummy (not shown); however, the regression predicts
the Korean event of 1950:3 with a probability of 58 percent (row 4).
A further examination of the OLS prediction equations for the government spending
shock in rows 1 and 2 also reveals that the predictive power of the Ramey-Shapiro dummy
comes mostly from the Korean War (by far the largest of all the episodes): the last column
of Table 2 shows that over the shorter sample starting in 1954:1 the 4 lags of the Ramey-
Shapiro dummy (or dummies) do not help predict the SVAR shocks. However, the SVAR
shocks still predict the Ramey-Shapiro dummy, with a p-value of .01.
A second candidate to assess the predictability of the estimated SVAR shocks is in-
dependent assessments of the ﬁscal stance. Since 1984, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce
publishes twice a year in T h eE c o n o m i ca n dB u d g e tO u t l o o k (usually in February-March
and August-September) revisions of changes of government spending and revenues during
the year of the forecast, and up to 5 year thereafter, relative to the previous forecasts.20
These changes are divided in three categories: technical, legislative, and economic (the
latter are those that are due to changes in the economic environment).
Table 3: Forecastability of SVAR shocks using CBO revisions
OLS regression of SVAR g shock on CBO forecasts Full sample Short sample
1 SVAR shock on lagged CBO forecast revisions 0.62 .21
2 SVAR shock on contemp. CBO forecast revisions 0.15 .05
The last two columns display the p-value of a test of the exclusion of the regressor
in the equation. "Full sample": 1947:1-2005:4; "Short sample": 1954:1-2005:4. The
ﬁscal shocks are obtained from quarterly VARs estimated over these two samples. The
p-values are obtained from a regression of these ﬁscal shocks on the CBO forecast,
o v e rt h es a m p l es t a r t i n gi nt h eﬁrst semester of 1984:1.
In row 1 of Table 3 I take the average of the SVAR government spending shock
(expressed as share of GDP by multiplication by the average spending / GDP ratio)
in the ﬁrst and second quarters and in the third and fourth quarters of year t,a n d
regress this half-yearly variable on the sum of the legislative and technical CBO forecast
revisions (normalized by potential output) for year t made in the previous semester. In
both samples, the coeﬃcient of the CBO forecast is insigniﬁcant.21
Thus, there is little evidence that the SVAR shocks are predictable: but do they make
sense? When the SVAR government spending shock is regressed not on the lagged value,
20I thank Alan Auerbach for providing the data.
21The ﬁscal shocks are derived from VARs estimated on the full and shorter sample, respectively.
Obviously the p-values of Table 3 are obtained from a regression estimated with the semi-annual data
that start in 1984:1.
15but on the contemporaneous value of the sum of the CBO legislative and technical forecast
revisions, the p-value is .15 in the long sample and .05 in the short sample (Row 2 of
Table 3). Thus, the data suggest that the SVAR government spending shocks estimated
over the shorter sample are contemporaneously correlated with the information contained
in the CBO forecasts.
5 Explaining the diﬀerence in the Ramey-Shapiro
episodes
Besides the change in total government spending, ﬁscal policies during the four Ramey-
Shapiro episodes diﬀered markedly both in terms of the accompanying tax policies and
in terms of the composition of government spending.
5.1 The role of taxes
Figures 4 and 5 display historical decompositions of consumption in the four episodes.22
For each episode, two series are displayed. First, the deviation from the actual con-
sumption path of the consumption forecast, based on information up to the start of
the episode plus the sequence of government spending shocks during the ﬁve years of
the forecast horizon (“g_shocks”). This variable describes what the deviation from the
actual consumption would have been if only the SVAR government spending shocks had
occurred after the beginning of each episode. Second, the deviation of the consumption
forecast from the actual consumption path, based on the sequence of net tax shocks only
(“t_shocks”), constructed in a similar manner. Both series are expressed as shares of
GDP by multiplying the log response by the average consumption / GDP ratio.
The ﬁrst panel is based on the VAR estimated over the long sample starting in 1947:1.
Except in the Reagan buildup, government spending shocks make a positive contribution
to consumption, and only slightly larger in the Korean war than in the Vietnam war or
in the Bush buildup. Tax shocks make a negative contribution in the Korean war and the
Reagan buildup, when taxes increased, and a positive contribution in the Vietnam and
Bush buildups, when taxes fell. The contribution of tax shocks is generally smaller than
that of government spending shocks.
The next panel is based on the shorter sample. The estimated contribution of gov-
ernment spending shocks in the Vietnam war increases considerably, to about 1.5 percent
of GDP. In fact, the contribution of government spending by itself accounts for all the
deviation of consumption from trend estimated by the DV3 approach during this episode.
22Because the Barro-Sahasakul tax rate is an annual variable, to obtain tax shocks in this section I
replace this variable with the log of real per capita net taxes.
165.2 The composition of government spending
The composition of the government spending changes in the four episodes was also diﬀer-
ent. Figure 6 displays impulse responses to the Ramey-Shapiro dummy variables, from
the benchmark VAR where government spending has been split into its defense and non-
defense components. The ﬁrst row displays the response of civilian spending, the second of
defense spending, and the third of their sum, total government spending. In all episodes
defense spending increases and, except in Vietnam, civilian spending falls; and in the
Reagan and Bush buildups the change in civilian spending is almost of the same size (in
absolute value) as teh change in defense spending, accounting for the limited change in
total government spending.
In a SVAR, one must distinguish between shocks to defense and to civilian government
spending. Columns 1 and 2 of Figure 7 display responses to a civilian and defense spending
shock, respectively, from the same 8-variable VAR with civilian and defense spending
instead of total government spending. In both columns the initial shock is renormalized
so that total government spending increases by 1 percent of GDP. To derive the responses,
civilian spending is ordered before defense spending, but the opposite ordering would
produce the same results.
The response of total government spending to a civilian shock is much more intensive
in defense civilian expenditure, but it is also much less persistent; yet the positive response
of consumption to a civilian spending shock is much larger - almost 1.5 percentage points
of GDP after 2 years, against .5 percentage points after a defense shock. The same con-
s i d e r a t i o n sa l s oh o l di nt h eI 1s p e c i ﬁcation (columns 3 and 4); in fact, now the diﬀerence
in the persistence of total government spending after the two shocks is larger, yet so is
the diﬀerence in the response of consumption.
In response to a defense spending shock investment (row 6) always falls, while in
response to a civilian shock it rises in the LT speciﬁcation, and falls (but less than after
a defense shock) in the I1 speciﬁcation.
Thus, the evidence from the SVAR approach is that civilian government spending
shocks appear to be associated with stronger responses of GDP and its components.
6 Evidence from long run annual data
To overcome the problems of both the DV and the SVAR approaches, Ramey (2006)
advocates estimating a SVAR with annual data. The DV approach is based on very few
episodes with diﬀerent features; this can be mitigated by the longer sample available with
annual data. And if changes in government spending are mostly anticipated by one or
two quarters, then the estimated shocks have a better chance to be unanticipated (based
on an information set of yearly variables).
But against this, there are two disadvantages. The SVAR approach to identiﬁcation
17hinges on decision lags in ﬁscal policy: by and large government spending on goods and
services does not respond to macroeconomic news within a quarter. This identifying
assumption is less plausible with annual data: but then, if government spending is used
as a countercyclical tool, it is likely to impart a negative bias to the estimated response
of consumption. Second, the quality of national account data deteriorates quickly as one
moves backward in time; and this problem is particularly severe for the key variable,
government spending.
Oﬃcial US annual national account data are available starting in 1929 from the De-
partment of Commerce; between 1889 and 1929, annual data have been estimated by
Kuznets and revised by Kendrick. Aside from a few amendments to make Kuznets’ series
more consistent with the Department of Commerce deﬁnitions used from 1929 onward,
for the purposes of this paper a major contribution of Kendrick’s work consists in adding
an estimate of government spending on goods and services. However, one should be aware
of a few problems with this series. For instance, between 1890 and 1902 state and local
purchases other than compensation of public school employees and new construction are
interpolated by a straight line; and straight line interpolation (albeit at shorter intervals)
is frequent for several other items. Also, as Kendrick acknowledges, the estimates of the
government spending deﬂators are often speculative.23
With this in mind, Figure 8 displays responses from a small 5-variable VAR that
includes government spending, GDP in the business sector,24 total private consumption25,
full-time-equivalent employment in the business sector, and wage and salary accruals per
full time equivalent employee in the business sector. This last variable starts in 1929,
the others in 1889; hence, when estimated over the longer sample the system consists of
the ﬁrst four variables only (also, employment is not in full time equivalent terms in this
case). As usual, the system is estimated in levels with a constant and a time trend, or in
ﬁrst diﬀerences with just a constant.
This speciﬁcation is similar to that of Ramey (2006) and, like there, the response
of consumption initially drops slightly but signiﬁcantly, by a similar amount to Ramey
(2006), less than .2 percentage points of GDP. If one excludes the years 1941-47 (not
shown), the initial drop remains, but then consumption rises slightly (but signiﬁcantly)
23The other key variable in this paper, private consumption expenditure, also has important problems
prior to 1929. In Kendrick’s work, this variable is obtained from Kuznets’s “ﬂow of goods to consumers”
by subtracting government direct services to consumers, in turn proxied by personal tax and nontax
payments. This is already a rough approximation; in addition, some components of this variable are
interpolated by a straight line, such as state and local personal tax receipts between 1890, 1902 and 1913.
Also, prior to 1919 there were no data on consumer expenditure on services; Kuznets used the ratio of
expenditure on services and on commodities “from occasional family budget studies” (Kendrick (1961),
p. 38).
24This uses the Kuznets-Kendrick data until 1929, ratio-linked with the BEA data afterwards. Results
with the Balke-Gordon GNP series are virtually identical.
25Until 1929, consumption of non-durables and services is not available separately.
18above trend.
However, these results depend heavily on the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h es a m p l e .I fo n ee s t i m a t e s
the same SVAR starting in 1929 (column 2), thus using only the BEA data based on a
consistent deﬁnition and no interpolations, just like in the quarterly SVAR the response
of private consumption of nondurables and services follows closely that of GDP (except
for the initial jump in the latter, caused by the jump in government spending): it still
declines very slightly on impact, but then increases to a peak of about .25 percentage
points of GDP above trend after 3 years.
In this type of investigations, the treatment of WWII and the Korean War is crucial.
Government spending on goods and services as a share of GDP rose from 14.8 percent of
GDP in 1940 to 47.9 percent in 1944, and from 15.9 percent of GDP in 1950 to 23.9 in
1953; over the same periods, private consumption of nondurables and services decreased
from 62.6 to 46.4 of GDP, and from 55 to 52.8 of GDP, respectively. As usual in these
cases, it is not obvious whether one wants to treat wars as outliers, or as episodes that
contain a lot of useful information; column 3 shows that, if one does leave out the years
1941-45 and 1950-53, the response of consumption rises considerably, to more than .4
percent of GDP after 1 year: interestingly, the standard errors are still quite small, and
all responses are still highly signiﬁcant.
However, what is perhaps even more unusual about wars is the dramatic, sudden
decline in government spending once they are over: between 1944 and 1946 government
spending fell from 47.9 to 17.8 percent of GDP, while between 1953 and 1955 it fell from
23.9 to 20.8 percent; consumption of nondurables and services increased from 46.4 to 57.8
percent of GDP after WWII, while it remained at around 53 percent after the Korean
War. In fact, if one leaves out also the years 1946-47 and 1954-55 (column 4), the response
of private consumption about doubles, reaching a peak of .8 percentage points of GDP
after 1 year: this is very close to the response of the SVAR estimated in quarterly data
from 1954:1.
The results in the I1 speciﬁcation (columns 5 to 8) are very similar: in particular, one
observes the same progression towards stronger responses of consumption as one moves to
the right. Thus, once reliable data are used the historical SVAR evidence on consumption
with annual data delivers results that are very similar to those of the quarterly SVARs,
a n dt ot h eD V 3a p p r o a c h .
Investment too displays stronger responses as one moves to the right. In the whole
sample starting in 1889, the response is negative, and remains so for the ﬁrst 3 years if
the sample starts in 1929. When the war and post-war periods are excluded, it becomes
positive and signiﬁc a n t . T h i si sd i ﬀerent from the quarterly SVAR, where investment
tends to fall after a government spending shock. Thus, the behavior of investment is
more diﬃcult to pin down than the response of consumption, and is less consistent with
the quarterly evidence.
197T h e l a b o r m a r k e t
7.1 The response of hours and the real product wage
With lump-sum taxation, virtually all models predict a positive eﬀect of shocks to govern-
ment spending on private and total hours. However, while the neoclassical model predicts
a decline in the real wage, some neo-keynesian models with price stickiness (like Galí,
López-Salido and Vallés (2006) or Linnemann and Schabert (2003))26 or other reasons for
countercyclical markups (like Rotemberg and Woodoford (1992) or Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2006)) predict the opposite.
It is important to be clear on the deﬁnition of the real wage. Obviously in a one sector
model there is no distinction between the real consumption wage and the real product
wage. But the logics of the diﬀerent predictions of the neoclassical and neokeynesian
models also survive with more than one sector. In a neoclassical model with frictions
in reallocating capital between sectors like Ramey and Shapiro (1998), the sector that
experiences the larger increase in government demand also displays the larger fall in the
product wage, as employment shifts from one sector to the other along the sectoral labor
demand curves. In contrast, in a two-sector neokeynesian model with nominal price
rigidities and some costs of labor reallocation across sectors like Monacelli and Perotti
(2007), the sector that receives the larger share of the government spending shock also
exhibits the larger increase in the real product wage, as the markup falls more in that
sector. Thus, sectoral evidence can shed light on the underlying transmission mechanism
for ﬁscal policy.
Manufacturing plausibly receives a disproportionate share of the shocks to government
spending on goods, hence the importance of this sector in testing alternative transmission
mechanisms. On the other hand, a rise in the real consumption wage is the precondition
for private consumption to increase in neokeynesian models (see section 10), hence the
importance of checking the response of this variable too.
Figure 9 presents responses of hours and the real wage from the benchmark 7-variable
speciﬁcation, that includes government spending, the average marginal income tax rate,
GDP, consumption, investment, plus an employment/hour variable and a wage variable.
I nt h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h ee ﬀects of technological shocks, several diﬀerent employment and
real wage variables have been used; as Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) note, the
results are somewhat sensitive to the variable used. I use non-farm business sector hours
and average weekly compensation (deﬂated by the value added deﬂator in the non-farm
business sector), or manufacturing hours and hourly earnings (deﬂated by the manu-
facturing PPI). I also experiment with private and total employment, but these behave
very much like business sector employment, hence I will not report their responses. For
26The nature of the friction is important here: in general, models with nominal wage rigidity do not
have the same prediction.
20brevity, I will refer to both business sector compensation and manufacturing earnings as
“real product wage”, or “real wage”.
In the DV1 case, and in each of the four episodes separately, the responses of hours
follow closely that of GDP. Only in the Korean and Vietnam wars do hours increase, and
in manufacturing more than in the business sector. The real wage in manufacturing also
increases in these two episodes, by up to 13 and 6 percent, respectively. Like hours, it
is ﬂat in the Reagan buildup, and increases in the Bush buildup despite the decline in
manufacturing hours. In the business sector the real wage does not move signiﬁcantly.
The picture is similar in the modiﬁed DV approaches, except that now manufacturing
hours, like GDP, decline in the Reagan buildup and increase (with a delay) in the Bush
buildup. The manufacturing real wage also declines in the former episode, but increases
with a lag in the latter. Thus, in the modiﬁed approach, the manufacturing real wage
moves in the same direction as hours except in the Bush buildup.
The last two rows display the real product wage and the real after-tax consumption
wage in the business sector.27 The real product wage falls in the two episodes in which
the tax rate falls, Vietnam and Bush, and rises in the other two. For neo-keynesian
models it is the real consumption wage that is of particular interest, since only if it
increases can private consumption also increase. The last row shows that there is a close
correspondence between the response of this variable and that of consumption. The real
after-tax consumption wage falls initially during the Korean War, due to the increase in
taxation, then picks up; it increases during the Vietnam war, even if the pre-tax product
wage falls; it falls during the Reagan episode, and it is nearly ﬂat during the Bush buildup,
due to the decline in taxation.
Figure 10 displays VAR responses to a government spending shock. In the LT spec-
iﬁcation, hours rise in both sectors, and more in the shorter sample starting in 1954,
although in the case of manufacturing only after a sharp but brief decline. The real wage
increases in both sectors, and much more in manufacturing (a peak of between 3 and 4
percent after about 2 years). In the I1 speciﬁcation, hours are ﬂat, but the real wage still
increases in both sectors. These ﬁndings are consistent with those of Fatas and Mihov
(2001), who identify government spending shocks via a Choleski decomposition, and of
Pappa (2005), who uses a sign restriction approach.28
Hourly labor productivity in manufacturing declines, by 1 percent in the long sam-
p l ea n da l m o s t2p e r c e n ti nt h es h o r ts a m p l e( t h i si sd e r i v e df r o maV A Rt h a ti n c l u d e s
real manufacturing value added besides the other 7 variables). The increase in the man-
27The after-tax wage is computed by multiplying compensation in the business sector times 1 less the
average marginal income tax rate.
28Using a BLS series of producer prices in manufacturing (discontinued aftre 1996:1)) to deﬂate nominal
manufacturing earnings, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004) ﬁnd a persistent decline in real product earnings in the DV1 and DV2 approaches, respectively.
When I use this series, kindly provided to me by Jonas Fisher, I also ﬁnd a decline in manufacturing
earnings in the DV1 approach and in each of the episodes separately, and also in the SVAR approach.
21ufacturing real wage, combined with a fall in productivity, seems inconsistent with the
benchmark neoclassical model with perfectly competitive goods and labor markets. It is
consistent with some neokeynesian models with price stickiness or other reasons for coun-
tercyciclical markups (although in general not with models with wage rigidity), where the
fall in the markup allows the real product wage to rise despite the decline in productivity.
The last row of the ﬁgure shows that the after-tax real consumption wage in the
business sector behaves very much like the pre-tax product wage; it only displays an
initial decline, by almost 1 percent, in the longer sample; this is consistent with the
positive response of the tax rate (in turn inﬂuenced by the Korean war) documented in
Figure 3.
7.2 Government employment shocks and the labor market
All the discussion so far has implicitly assumed that government spending on goods and
services falls entirely on goods produced by the private sector; in reality, typically about
half of it consists of government wages, i.e. of services produced by the government
sector itself. As Finn (1996) and Cavallo (2005) emphasize, in the neoclassical model
the distinction between government employment and spending on goods has important
implications. Both types of spending have a negative wealth eﬀect on the consumer; but
for plausible parameter values a government employment shock raises the real product
wage and reduces private employment: the reason is that the higher labor supply caused
by the negative wealth eﬀect is less than the increase in government employment: hence,
private employment falls, and the real product wage in the private sector increases. As
shown in Pappa (2005), a government employment shock has similar eﬀects on private
employment and the real product wage in the private sector in a neokeynesian model with
price stickiness.
I estimate the same benchmark VARs as above, but now government spending is split
into its two components: real spending on goods and real spending on government employ-
ment. As a measure of the latter I take the log of total government employment, divided
by population. Figure 11 shows that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes were overwhelmingly
on goods expenditure (in fact, government wage expenditure declined in the Reagan and
Bush episodes).
In a SVAR, distinguishing the two spending components allows one to construct two
government spending shocks that turn out to have very diﬀerent properties. Column 1
of Figure 12 displays the responses to a government employment shock of government
spending on wages, goods spending, and their sum total government spending29,t h e no f
GDP, consumption, and hours and the real wage in the business sector and manufacturing;
column 2 displays the responses of the same variables, but to a goods spending shock.
29The response of government employment is converted into the response of government spending on
wages by multiplying the former by the average share of government wages in GDP.
22In all cases the shocks are normalized so that the impact response of total government
spending is equal to 1 percent of GDP. In the ﬁgure, the government employment and
goods spending shocks are orthogonalized in this order; the results with the alternative
ordering are nearly identical. The sample starts in 1954:1.
In all speciﬁcations, the government employment shock generates a highly persistent
response of government employment itself, and a sizable response of goods spending; in
contrast, the goods spending shock generates virtually no response of government employ-
ment , and much less persistence in total spending. Thus, the government employment
shock is much more persistent, and more wage-intensive.
GDP and consumption increase much more in response to a government employment
shock: for GDP, a peak of 4 percent against about .7 percent in response to a goods
spending shock; for consumption, more than 1.5 percent against .4 percent. The responses
of hours are also very diﬀerent: both increase in response to a government employment
shock, and are ﬂat in response to a goods spending shock. As usual, the response is
stronger in manufacturing, with a peak of about 6 percent after 1 year.30 The product
wage in manufacturing also responds much more strongly to a government employment
shock; the business sector real wage instead is ﬂat in both cases. In the I1 speciﬁcation,
the picture is similar, except that business sector hours do not increase after a government
employment shock, and now even the business sector real wage responds positively to the
same shock. The standard errors in the responses to the employment shock, however,
become large.
These results are in line with Pappa (2005), who ﬁn d sp o s i t i v er e s p o n s e so ft h er e a l
wage and, less sharply, of private employment to a government employment shock using
a sign restriction approach; with Linnemann (2006) who estimates a trivariate VAR with
government and private employment and GDP, and ﬁnds similar positive responses of
private employment to a government employment shock; and with Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1992), who ﬁnd a positive response of private hours and the real wage to a shock to
military employment.
This pattern of responses thus appears inconsistent with virtually all models we have
of the eﬀects of government employment shocks; in fact, it is very diﬃcult to obtain
a positive response of both private employment and the real private wage in either a
neoclassical or a neokeynesian model. The neoclassical model studied by Finn (1996)
predicts a positive response of the real wage in the private sector, but only because
private hours decline; the neo-keynesian model of Pappa (2005) has the same predictions,
although the mechanism is diﬀerent. In Linnemann (2006) government employment is
complementary to private consumption in the household’s utility: if the complementarity
is strong enough, a government employment shock can raise private consumption and
therefore private employment: but now the real wage must fall, as the economy is moving
30To put this response in perspective, note that a shock to the wage component of 1 percent of GDP
is roughly equivalent to a shock of 10 percent to government employment, given government wages.
23down a given labor demand in the private sector. .
7.3 Annual historical evidence on labor markets
Figure 13 presents responses to a government spending shock of 1 percent of GDP from
the 5-variable VARs, that includes government spending, GDP, private consumption, an
employment variable, and a real wage variable. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the employment
variable is full-time equivalent employees in the business sector (employees when the
sample starts in 1889); the real wage variable is total wage and salary accruals in the
business sector divided by full time equivalent employees in the business sector, and
deﬂated by the business sector deﬂator. In the second speciﬁcation, the output variable is
total GDP; the employment variable is full time equivalent employees in manufacturing;
the real wage variable is total wages and salaries in manufacturing divided by full time
equivalent employees, and deﬂated by the price index of goods: this speciﬁcation can be
estimated only from 1929. In column 1, the sampke starts in 1889; in column 2, in 1929; in
column 3, in 1929, but the years 1941-45 and 1950-53 are excluded; in column 4, 1946-47
and 1954-55 are also excluded.
Both employment variables respond positively to a government spending shock, and
again the response gets stronger as one moves rightward in the ﬁgure. Like before, man-
ufacturing employment responds more strongly than business sector employment.
The real wage response is also positive, although now it is stronger in the business
sector and it ceases to be signiﬁcant in manufacturing when the major wars and their
aftermaths are excluded. The I1 speciﬁcation gives a very similar picture.
The last two rows display the paths of productivity per full time equivalent employee
(in the case of manufacturing, this is derived from a VAR that includes real manufacturing
value added in addition to the other 5 variables) Labor productivity increases in the
business sector, while it falls in manufacturing. Ramey (2006) ﬁnds a similar result,
but does not look at the behavior of the real wage. As she argues, the pattern of the
productivity responses in the two sectors is consistent with a movement down a given
labor demand in manufacturing, with perfectly competitive goods market; it could reﬂect
a sectoral shift towards manufacturing industries, with higher returns to scale than the
average, although each individually has decreasing returns to scale.
However, the increase in the manufacturing real wage does not seem to square with this
interpretation; as argued in the discussion of the quarterly SVAR, it is instead consistent
with a model with countercyclical markups.
8 Evidence from the input output tables of the US
As observed above, because manufacturing receives a disproportionate share of the in-
crease in governments spending around the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, the evidence on this
24sector is likely to be key to our understanding of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. However, man-
ufacturing consists of many industries, only a few of which were the target of substantial
increases in government spending during the Ramey-Shapiro episodes. An alternative
approach to VAR analysis could shed new light.
The US input-output tables provide information on government purchases by sector,
at 4- and 6-digit levels, on dates that are almost exactly equally spaced about the starts
of two Ramey and Shapiro episodes: in 1963 and 1967, and in 1977 and 1982. The NBER
Manufacturing Productivity Database contains annual information on wages, employment,
output and producer prices in 450 manufacturing industries at the 4-digit level between
1958 and 1991. These two datasets can be combined to obtain information on changes in
real government purchases, real output, hours, employment, and the real hourly product
wage, by manufacturing industry, during the last two Ramey-Shapiro episodes.31





Yi,77 denote the changes in Gi over the Vietnam War and the
Carter-Reagan buildup, as shares of the initial year’s industry output. Column 3 of Table
4 lists the ﬁrst ten industries in the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan buildup, by
the value of this variable; for each of these industries, column 4 shows the share of





This list appears to make intuitive sense: most industries in it are clearly defense-related.
The next columns of the table display the percentage changes of real output, of hours,
and of the real hourly product wage of production workers. The percentage changes are
calculated between the averages during the last two years of the episodes (1966-67 or
1981-82, respectively) and the averages during the ﬁrst two years (1963-64 or 1977-78).
Not surprisingly, virtually all these industries experienced a large increase in output
and hours. More interestingly, in both episodes the real product wage increased in 8
industries out of 10.
In the ﬁrst row of Table 5, columns 2 to 4 displays the unweighted average of
∆Gi,67/63
Yi,63
in the top, middle, and bottom 20 industries, respectively, by the value of this variable;
columns 4 to 6 display the signiﬁcance level of their diﬀerences. The next rows show that
t h eo r d e ro ft h ea v e r a g ec h a n g e si no u t p u t ,h o u r s( w i t ho n ee x c e p t i o n ) ,a n dt h er e a lw a g e
in the three groups is the same as that of the average change in government spending.
31The hourly wage is obtained by dividing total production worker wages by the total number of hours
of production workers.
32The input-output tables do not provide separate information on the ﬁxed capital formation component
of non-defense spending, which was excluded from the deﬁnition of the government spending variable in
the VARs estimated so far.
The tables contain data on both direct and total government purchases, but for the 1977 and 1982
tables only the latter information is available by industry (as opposed to commodities). Thus, in this
section the expression “government purchases” refers to direct plus indirect purchases.
The real values are computed deﬂating the nominal quantities provided by the input-output tables by
the industry’s price index of shipments in the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database.
25Table 4: Top 10 industries by change in government purchases













Ammunition, exc. small arms, nec. 1302 3483 347.62 80.97 260.83 170.01 -3.35
Small arms ammunition 1306 3482 167.75 43.35 151.06 147.81 10.32
Other ordnance and accessories 1307 3489 116.70 85.83 72.14 57.52 -4.79
Small arms 1305 3484 49.50 41.04 113.19 64.86 1.43
Semiconductors 5702 3674 43.75 41.67 94.73 52.88 33.58
Electromic components, nec 5703 3675 40.92 43.92 97.51 42.70 11.72
Watches and clocks and parts 6207 3873 29.59 11.72 34.33 17.08 9.02
Paving mixtures and blocks 3102 2951 29.19 50.36 18.65 2.69 8.96
Architectural metal work 4008 3446 25.11 28.37 11.50 -2.13 5.37













Semiconductors 570200 3674 81.26 25.42 128.84 16.04 71.53
Electronic computing equipm. 510101 3573 60.23 12.53 32.72 15.81 19.47
Ammunition, exc. small arms, nec. 130200 3483 57.44 68.62 313.01 43.49 147.78
Aircraft and missile equipm., nec 600400 3728 47.04 43.22 49.02 43.58 2.52
Aircraft and missile engines and parts 600200 3724 43.87 52.37 36.26 -1.12 12.32
Radio and TV communication equipm. 560400 3662 33.48 41.35 54.68 21.75 15.54
Electrical industrial apparatus, nec 530800 3629 30.56 12.88 14.73 -10.66 4.39
Guided missiles and space vehicles 130100 3761 30.53 82.44 33.74 34.27 -16.57
Other ordnance and accessories 130700 3489 27.28 62.05 27.47 9.94 14.55
Surgical appliances and supplies 620500 3842 24.79 22.03 -9.15 -1.56 -6.01
Source: see text. Column 1: Input-Output Industry Classiﬁcation, 1963 and 1977 editions respectively.
Column 2: Standard Industry Classiﬁcation, 1972 edition. Column 3: change in real government spending
in industry i between 1967 and 1963, as a share of output of industry i in 1963. Column 4: Government
spending on industry i in 1963, as a share of output of industry i in 1963. Column 5: Percentage change in
output in industry i, average of 1966-67 relative to average of 1963-64. Column 6: Percentage change in hours
in industry i, average of 1966-67 relative to average of 1963-64. Column 7: Percentage change in real hourly
product wage in industry i, average of 1966-67 relative to average of 1963-64.
Similar deﬁnitions apply to the second panel. The initial and end years are 1977 and 1982. The averages are
taken over the years 1977-78 and 1981-82.
G: total government spending on the sector; Y : real output of the sector; H: hours of production workers in
the sector. W: real hourly product wage of production workers in the sector.
26Table 5: Average changes, by industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)








Yi,63 61.49 17.10 16.34 0.00 0.00 0.94
(3)
∆Hi,67/63
Hi,63 37.77 8.95 10.23 0.00 0.00 0.85
(4)
∆Wi,67/63
Wi,63 8.03 5.47 5.29 0.34 0.31 0.95
Average log changes, deviations from trend
(5)
∆Yi,67/63
Yi,63 71.23 22.17 10.96 0.00 0.00 0.33
(6)
∆Hi,67/63
Hi,63 62.28 23.92 22.93 0.00 0.00 0.93
(7)
∆Wi,67/63








Yi,77 42.39 -2.32 -13.13 0.00 0.00 0.17
(10)
∆Hi,82/77
Hi,77 10.01 -8.16 -15.56 0.00 0.00 0.18
(11)
∆Wi,82/77
Wi,77 15.90 4.39 0,29 0.02 0.00 0.39
Average log changes, deviations from trend
(12)
∆Yi,82/77
Yi,77 39.86 -26.98 -48.78 0.00 0.00 0.10
(13)
∆Hi,82/77
Hi,77 20.39 -14.81 -28.08 0.00 0.00 0.25
(14)
∆Wi,82/77
Wi,77 10.86 -8.15 -17.18 0.01 0.00 0.20
Source: see text. Deﬁnition of variables: see previous table.
27This holds whether one considers the actual changes in these variables (rows 2 to 4) or
the changes of their detrended values (rows 5 to 7).33 T h es a m ea p p l i e st ot h eC a r t e r -
Reagan buildup (rows 8 to 14). In particular, the average change in the real product wage
is always highest in the top 20 industries and lowest in the bottom 20 industries. For
hours and output the diﬀerence between the top and middle and between the top and
bottom groups is always signiﬁcant; for the product wage, it is always signiﬁcant in the
Carter-Reagan buildup; in the Vietnam War, only the diﬀerence between the top and
bottom groups in the detrended case is signiﬁcant.
Note also that the average changes in output and hours imply that productivity on
average rises in the top 20 industries, that experience an increase in government purchases,
and declines or is stagnant in the bottom 20 industries, that experience a decline in
government purchases.
Thus, the sectoral evidence provides independent conﬁrmation of the main conclusions
of the SVAR evidence on labor markets: the sectors that experienced the largest govern-
ment spending shocks are also the sectors that experienced the largest positive changes
in the real product wage. This result is consistent with two-sector neo-keynesian models
but not with two-sector neoclassical models.
9O u t s i d e t h e U S
9.1 Quarterly data
The key constraint in estimating ﬁscal policy VARs in countries other than the US is
the existence of non-interpolated quarterly data on government spending spanning a long
enough period. I have assembled the relevant data for Australia (1959:3 - 2006:2), Canada
(1961:1 - 2006:3) and the United Kingdom (1963:1 - 2006:2). As much as possible, the
deﬁn i t i o n sa r et h es a m ea si nt h eU S :a l lﬁscal variables cover the general government,
government spending on goods and services excludes government capital formation but,
following the National Account guidelines, includes most expenditure on military equip-
ment; private consumption includes nondurables and services, except in Australia where it
is total private consumption. I use the same benchmark 7-variable speciﬁcation estimated
for the US, except that, since the average marginal income tax rate is not available for
these countries, it is replaced by the log of real net taxes per capita.34 Like in the US,
33In her discussion, Valeri Ramey makes the point that, if one subtracts an average annual rate of
TFP growth of 3 percent, the changes in the real product wage in Table 4 mostly become negative, thus
supporting the neoclassical model. However, this would leave the ranking of the three groups in Table
5u n a ﬀected. In addition, note that the average response of the real product wage in the top group of
industries in Table 5 is positive even after the real wage has been detrended.
34In the case of Australia, data on wages and employment are available only from 1980. Hence, these
two variables are replaced by the GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate and by the 3-months interest rate.
28the alternative speciﬁcations give nearly identical results.
Row 1 of Figure 14 displays the response of government spending, GDP, consumption
and investment. To facilitate comparison, the ﬁrst column displays anew the US responses
in the LT speciﬁcation over the shorter sample starting in 1954:1, the following columns
display Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom; columns 5 to 8 do the same for the I1
speciﬁcation.
There are two key messages from this table: the responses of GDP and consumption
tend to be positive in all countries and all speciﬁcations; but they are also smaller than
in the US, and in a few cases insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
In the LT speciﬁcation, the responses of GDP and consumption are positive and
signiﬁcant in all countries (although they turn negative in the UK after 6 quarters), but
outside the US the consumption response is rarely larger than .5 percentage points of
GDP, against a peak of more than 1 percent in the US. A similar pattern is displayed by
the I1 speciﬁcation, except that now GDP and consumption in Canada are insigniﬁcant,
while in the UK they are now positive and signiﬁcant over the whole horizon.
There is slightly less regularity across countries in the response of investment: in the
LT speciﬁcation, it is negative in the US, Canada, and the UK (after a small and brief
positive impact response), and positive in Australia. Like in the US, this response is
driven by machinery and equipment investment and, to a lesser extent, by structures;
outside the US, private residential investment tends to increase slightly, by between .1
and .2 percent of GDP, after a government spending shock.
9.2 Historical evidence with annual data
Figure 15 displays impulse responses from a small 4-variable SVAR in government spend-
ing, GDP, private consumption, and investment, estimated using long-run annual data in
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, plus the US as a comparison.35 Over these
long samples, outside the US only total private consumption is available. The ﬁrst 4 rows
display the responses of the 4 variables in the LT speciﬁcation, the next 4 rows of the I1
speciﬁcation.
For Australia, Butlin (1977) has assembled yearly data covering the period 1901-1948.
However, until 1939 private consumption was computed residually from estimates of GDP
and its other components, and is thus unusable; and most data for the war years are
Germany also has quarterly data, but the amount of detail from the primary source is limited, and the
large break in 1989 makes it diﬃcult to estimate a meaningful VAR. Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen and Wolﬀ
(2006) estimate a SVAR on German data between 1974:1-2004:4, prolonging the data for Germany after
1991 backward using West German growth rates, and ﬁnd a positive response of private consumption to
a government spending shock. A few other countries, like France and Italy, have data starting in 1980,
but the amount of interpolation is unclear.
35Long-run data for labor market variables are available only for the US and Canada, hence the smaller
4-variable speciﬁcation to ensure consistency across countries.
29considered “unreliable” by the author himself. The Australian Bureau of Statistics now
publishes thoroughly revised annual data on a number of variables going back to 1949,
with a consistent deﬁnition.36 When the long sample - combining the Butlin data up to
1948 and the ABA data from 1949 - is used (column 3), the response of consumption is
signiﬁcantly negative; this is consistent with the mechanical negative correlation between
government and private consumption due to the residual nature of the latter. When the
VAR is estimated from 1949, thus using only the consistent ABA data (column 4), the
response of consumption is now positive (after a small initial decline), sizeable (just below
1 percent of GDP), and signiﬁcant at 2 years.
Statistics Canada publishes historical annual series with a consistent deﬁnition going
back to 1926. Over the whole sample (column 5) the response of consumption is signiﬁ-
cantly positive, with a peak of .6 percentage points of GDP after 5 years. This is robust
to the exclusion of WWII (column 6), although not in ﬁrst diﬀerences (row 7).
In the United Kingdom, annual data on the variables of interest are published in
the Blue Book from 1948 using a consistent deﬁnition; Feinstein (1972) provides data
going back to 1870. But up to about 1920 many series are considered unreliable: in
Feinstein (1972) GDP, depending on the decade gross ﬁxed capital formation, consumers’
expenditure and central government spending get subjective “reliability assessments” of
B or C (on a declining scale from A to C). For the period 1900-1938 “little information
on actual expenditure or retail sales is available” (page 45); and importantly, the results
of the government expenditure deﬂation “are very rough, and especially for the war years
are best treated with extreme scepticism” (page 78).
Column 7 of Figure 15 shows that over the whole sample consumption drops signiﬁ-
cantly to about -.8 percentage points of GDP after 3 years. These results are robust to
the exclusion of WWI (WWII is not in the sample because there are no data on private
investment between 1938 and 1946). But again, if one starts with the oﬃcial data in 1948
(column 8), the decline in consumption is smaller, and is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.37
In ﬁrst diﬀerences (row 7) consumption rises signiﬁcantly above 0.
As usual, it is more diﬃcult to identify a clear pattern in the investment responses,
but outside the US investment increases only in Australia in the I1 speciﬁcation and in
Canada in the LT speciﬁcation when wars are excluded.
Thus, when data of “good” quality are used (in particular non-interpolated, non-
residual government spending and consumption data), out of the 8 country-speciﬁcation
pairs that exclude wars, the response of consumption is signiﬁcantly negative (but small)
in one case, ﬂat in another, and signiﬁcantly positive in the remaining 6 cases. Like in
36On overlappimg years, the discrepancy between the nominal values of these series and the earlier
national account estimates, themselves more consistent with Butlin’s estimates for 1901-1939, can be of
the order of 100 percent for some series.
37In addition, the decline in the post-war period is entirely due to the years 1974-76, when government
spending incerased sìubstantially in response to what was perceived as a temporary negative shock.
30quarterly data, the consumption response tends to be smaller than in the US.
Table 6 displays the cumulative GDP and consumption multipliers of government
spending at 2 years from the quarterly SVARs (ﬁrst panel) and from the annual SVARs
(second panel), both in the LT and in the I1 speciﬁcations. In quarterly data, the con-
sumption multiplier is nearly 0 in Canada; it is positive and quite similar (between .35
and .45) in the other countries, although in Australia it is not signiﬁcant. In all cases the
multipliers in the LT and I1 speciﬁcations are very close.
In annual data, in the US the consumption multiplier is large and nearly double the
quarterly multiplier, but in the other countries there is more dispersion.
Table 6: Cumulative multipliers of govt. spending at 2 years
USA AUS CAN GBR USA AUS CAN GBR
quarterly, LT quarterly, I1
GDP 0.98* 1.33* -0.34 0.57 0.72* 1.26* -0.46 0.66
CONS 0.42* 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.46* 0.23 -0.02 0.35*
annual, LT annual, I1
GDP 3.05* 1.13* 1.59* 0.28 3.03* 1.68* 0.22 0.69
CONS 0.98* -0.28 0.19* -0.03 0.83* -0.19 -0.27* 0.62*
First panel: cumulative GDP and consumption multipliers from 4-
variable VAR estimated on quarterly data. Second panel: cumulative
GDP and consumption multipliers from same 4-variable VAR esti-
mated on annual data. Samples for annual VARs: USA: from 1929,
WWII and Korean War excluded; Australia: from 1949; Canada: from
1926, WWII exclued; United Kingdom: from 1948.
An asterisk "*" indicates that 0 is outside the region between the two
one-standard error bands at that horizon.
9.3 The labor market
Figure 16 displays the results for labor market variables in the US, Canada and the UK (in
Australia, data on wages and employment are available only from 1983). These are based
on the usual benchmark 7-variable VAR also used to derive the responses of consumption
and investment, that includes g, t, y, c,k, e (a measure of hours or employment) and w
(a measure of earnings or compensation). The ﬁrst row displays the response of GDP;
the second row of the employment variable with the largest coverage available (total
employment in the US, the whole industry in Canada, and all civilian jobs in the UK);
the third row of manufacturing hours (in the US) or employment (in Canada). The next
two rows display the responses of the corresponding real product wages.38
38This is: in row 4, hourly business sector compensation deﬂated by its onw deﬂator (USA); average
weekly earnings of all employees in the industrial composite, deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator (Canada);
31Outside the US, it is surprisingly diﬃcult to ﬁnd a positive response of employment
variables to a government spending shock, despite the positive GDP response: only in the
UK in the I1 speciﬁcation can one ﬁnd a positive response of overall employment. In all
countries and speciﬁcations, the real product wage increases signiﬁcantly, and again more
in manufacturing.
9.4 Annual historical evidence on labor markets
Outside the US, only Canada has long enough historical annual series on employment and
the real wage, and only in manufacturing. Figure 17 displays responses to a government
spending shock of 1 percent of GDP from a 5 variable VARs that includes government
spending, GDP, private consumption, manufacturing employment, and the manufacturing
real wage, exactly like that estimated for the US. And like in the US, manufacturing
employment rises in Canada, except in the I1 speciﬁcation when wars are excluded (the
same speciﬁcation that exhibited no increase in consumption). The peak employment
response is between 1 and 2 percent.
Like in the quarterly SVAR, the response of the manufacturing real wage is always
positive and signiﬁcant, with peaks of above 2 percent when wars are excluded.
10 A brief review of recent models of ﬁscal policy
This section brieﬂyr e v i e w st h ee ﬀects of purchases of goods and services by the govern-
ment in the recent macro literature, to point out the key testable diﬀerences. In all cases, I
will assume that taxation is lump-sum, government spending consists of purchasing goods
produced by the private sector that are then thrown away, and there is only one sector in
the economy. For the reasons discussed in the introduction, the discussion will focus on
the eﬀects of government spending on GDP, private consumption, employment, and the
real wage.
In the standard neoclassical model studied by Baxter and King (1993) a forward-
looking representative agent can borrow and lend freely at the market interest rate; the
production function has constant returns to scale, all prices are ﬂexible, all goods and
factor markets are perfectly competitive, and the utility function is separable in con-
sumption and leisure. From the intertemporal government budget constraint, an increase
i ng o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gm u s tb em a t c h e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt a x a t i o no ft h es a m ev a l u e
in present discounted value terms. Hence, the individual is poorer in lifetime terms, and
reduces her consumption and leisure; as labor supply shifts out, output increases and the
real wage falls along a given labor demand.
average earnings index for the whole economy, deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator (UK). In row 5, average
weekly earnings of manufacturing production workers (USA) and employees (Canada), deﬂated by the
manufacturing PPI.
32Thus, in this model the eﬀects of a government spending shock on consumption and
the real wage follow directly from two key features: the negative wealth eﬀect, and the sep-
arability of consumption and leisure. Two broad classes of models eliminate or counteract
these two features to reach diﬀerent predictions about the response of private consump-
tion, or the real wage, or both.
In the non-separable model of Linnemann (2006) the only diﬀerence is that the
utility function is non-separable in leisure and consumption. As leisure falls following
the negative wealth eﬀect, the substitutability between consumption and leisure implies
that the marginal utility of consumption must increase. Hence, both consumption and
hours increase. However, as Bilbiie (2006) shows, for consumption to increase it must be
t h ec a s et h a ti ti sa ni n f e r i o rg o o d ;a n df o rc o n s u m p t i o na n dh o u r st om o v ei nt h es a m e
direction, one of the two must be an inferior good.
T h en e x tm o d i ﬁcation of the neoclassical mechanism consists in allowing a government
spending shock to cause a rightward shift in the aggregate demand for labor. If this eﬀect
is strong enough, the real wage can increase; in turn, this can (but not necessarily does)
induce a higher consumption, through two basic mechanisms: the substitution eﬀect and
credit constraints. There is more than one way to get a government spending eﬀect on
the aggregate demand for labor: for lack of a better name, I lump this class of models
based on movements in labor demand that are not caused by productivity shocks under
the heading of neokeynesian models.
1) Countercyclical mark-ups. With some monopoly power in the goods market,
labor demand is deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization FL(Lt, ...)=
µtwt, where F is the production function, L is labor demand, w is the real product wage,
and µ is the markup. If µt falls when government spending increases, from FLL < 0 labor
demand will increase for a given w. I nt h ew e l lk n o w nm o d e lo fR o t e m b e r ga n dW o o d f o r d
(1992), a government spending shock increases current demand relative to future demand
and therefore raises the incentives to undercut collusive pricing between oligopolistic ﬁrms.
The only incentive compatible collusive agreement is then to reduce the mark-up when
aggregate demand increases.
In Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uríbe (2006) the demand function facing each producer
has a price-elastic component that is a function of aggregate demand, and a price-inelastic
component that is a function of the producer speciﬁc habit. An increase in aggregate
demand, caused for instance by a shock to government spending, increases the share of
the price-elastic component and thus the elasticity of demand, which in turn makes the
markup countercyclical.
2) Nominal rigidities. With price stickiness, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
meet the extra demand caused by a government spending shock by supplying more output;
labor demand increases as output rises (thus, these models also exhibit countercyclical
markups conditional on a government spending shock). As shown in Linnemann and
Schabert (2003), if the interest rate rule does not put too much weight on output, the
33real wage can increase despite the shift in labor supply. Note that the nature of the
rigidity matters: with wage rigidity, the real wage might well fall after a government
spending shock.
3) Increasing returns. In Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996), higher government
spending raises the equilibrium number of ﬁr m st h a tc a no p e r a t ei nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t e g o o d
sectors, where there are increasing returns to specialization. Hence, the productivity of
all ﬁrms in the sector increase, and despite the standard negative wealth eﬀect on labor
supply the resulting outshift in labor demand can lead to a higher equilibrium real wage.
A similar mechanism operates in Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
Once the real wage rises because of one of these three mechanisms, there are basically
two ways to get a rise in consumption. First, the higher real wage induces individuals to
substitute from leisure into consumption, thereby inducing an increase in consumption:
t h i si st h er o u t et a k e nb yR a v n ,S c h m i t t - G r o h éa n dU r í b e( 2 0 0 6 )a n dD e v e r e u x ,H e a da n d
Lapham (1996). In models with nominal rigidities, in general the increase in the real wage
will not be enough, by itself, to generate an increase in consumption The second route,
taken by Galí, Lopez-Salido and Vallés (2006), is then to appeal to credit constraints: a
share of the population cannot borrow or lend, and consume all their labor income in
each period. As the real wage increases, their consumption increases too. With enough of
these individuals, the model can generate a positive response of total private consumption
to a government spending shock.39
Note that, in order to generate a positive consumption response, these models need a
substantial real wage response. This runs counter to the notion that real wages tend to
be acyclical (unconditionally) over the cycle. But the evidence we have seen is that they
can be quite responsive to government spending shock.
Table 7 summarizes the key results discussed in this section.
Table 7: Models of government spending
Ls Ld L Y W/P C
Neoclassical ↑ = ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
Non-separable utility ↑ = ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
Neokeynesian ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
A“ ( ↑) ”indicates that the real wage or consumption can in-
crease if the shift in labor demand is large enough.
This classiﬁcation is obviously rather schematic. As we have seen, “neo-keynesian”
models are consistent with a wide variety of responses, depending for instance on the
nature of the nominal rigidity and the behavior of the monetary authorities. But in
39López-Salido and Rabanal (2006), Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2006), and Coenen and Straub (2005)
all estimate small DSGE models with credit constrained households.
34one sense it remains useful: because of the wealth eﬀect, with lump-sum taxation the
neoclassical model unambiguously generates a decline in private consumption following
a government spending shock; and even with distortionary taxation, one would need
rather extreme patterns of intertemporal substitution to generate a (temporary) increase
in consumption in response to a negative wealth eﬀect.
11 Conclusions
A r ew a r sn o r m a le v e n t sf r o mt h ep o i n to fv i e wo fﬁscal policy, just “bigger”? If they are,
it is diﬃcult to escape the conclusion that private consumption declines in response to a
shock to government spending: wars are plausibly exogenous, and during WWII the share
in GDP of government spending on goods and services more than tripled in 4 years, from
14.8 percent in 1940 to 47.9 percent in 1944, while private consumption of nondurables
and services declined from 62.6 to 46.4 of GDP. But even outside wars there is ﬁscal action
that can be exploited: the problem is how to disentangle its exogenous, unanticipated
component. The “narrative” or “Dummy Variable” approach tries to combine both ideas,
by looking at the typical deviation from the “normal” path of the endogenous variable
caused by a series of post-war “abnormal” ﬁscal events, namely four military buildups
driven by foreign policy, that can plausibly be regarded as exogenous and unanticipated.
In its original version, the method assumes that these “abnormal” ﬁscal events are entirely
(in the DV3 approach), or “almost” entirely (in the DV1 and DV2 approaches) responsible
for all the deviation from normal of all the varaibles during an horizon that is typically
assumed to be between 6 and 8 quarters. Under these assumptions, the method delivers
results that, especially in the DV1 and DV2 method, are supportive of the key neoclassical
mechanism: in response to a government spending shock, private consumption and the
real wage fall.
But possibly a better interpretation of the logic itself of the exercise consists in iso-
lating the “abnormal” ﬁscal events and estimate the “normal” response of the non-ﬁscal
endogenous variables to these events. Thus, this method allows for a number of non-ﬁscal
shocks to hit the economy during the time of the abnormal ﬁscal event. In this case, the
estimated normal response of consumption to abnormal events is now typically positive.
This is consistent with the impulse responses from an approach based on a structural
VAR. This last approach is subject to a diﬀerent type of criticism: its estimated shocks
might not be rally unanticipated by the private sector. To address this problem, Ramey
(2006) proposes to estimate SVARs with long-run annual data. I show that, when reliable
non-interpolated data are used, again the evidence supports the notion that the responses
of consumption and of the real wage to a government spending shock are positive In-
dependent evidence from the US input-output tables also indicates that the real product
wage increased more in the sectors that experience the greater increase in government
spending as a share of their output.
35Obviously there are many open questions, both in terms of methodology and in terms
of evidence. I will indicate only two. It is frequently asserted that government spending
is more eﬀective in stimulating the economy in times of recessions and low capacity uti-
lization. Although I know of no model that formalizes this idea, it is easy to see how a
model with occasionally binding credit constraints could generate this result. In ongoing
research with Ilian Mihov, we indeed ﬁnd preliminary evidence that shocks to government
spending generate a higher GDP and private consumption response in times of low GDP
growth.
A second open issue concerns the stability of the results across periods. The variances
of output and inﬂation have declined considerably after about 1980, and a growing
literature studies how changes in the conduct of monetary policy and in its transmission
mechanism might have contributed to this decline. There is evidence (see Perotti (2004)
and Romer and Romer (2006)) that both the variance of ﬁscal policy shocks and their
eﬀects on GDP and consumption also have declined in the last 20 years. Investigating
this issue further seems important to promote our understanding of the transmission
mechanism of ﬁscal policy.
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Figure 3: SVAR responses to government spending shocks
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Figure 4: Historical decomposition of consumption, 1947:1-2005:4
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Figure 17: Responses of labor market variables, annual historical data, USA and Canada,
SVAR
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